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Abstract. Traditionally, researchers in decision making have focused
on attempting to reach Pareto Optimality using horizontal approaches,
where optimality is calculated taking into account every participant at
the same time. Sometimes, this may prove to be a difficult task (e.g., con-
flict, mistrust, no information sharing, etc.). In this paper, we explore
the possibility of achieving Pareto Optimal outcomes in a group by using
a bottom-up approach: discovering Pareto optimal outcomes by interact-
ing in subgroups. We analytically show that Pareto optimal outcomes in
a subgroup are also Pareto optimal in a supergroup of those agents in
the case of strict , transitive, and complete preferences. Then, we em-
pirically analyze the prospective usability and practicality of bottom-up
approaches in a variety of decision making domains.
Keywords: pareto optimality, agreement technologies, group decision
making, multi-agent systems, artificial intelligence
1 Introduction
Group decision making has been studied within different disciplines with aim of
reaching a mutually acceptable outcome. One of the desired properties of that
outcome is Pareto optimality. However, reaching Pareto optimal agreements is
not straightforward in practice. In open and dynamic environments, decision
makers may not know each other’s preferences completely. It may even be the
case that it becomes more complicated to find Pareto optimal solutions when
the number of participants increases, as the number of interactions required to
achieve an optimal deal for the group may increase due to internal conflicts or
lack of trust.
A number of works in the field focus on finding a global Pareto optimal
solution by involving all agents at the same time [11,16,10,29], which may lead
to complicated interactions and lengthy decision making processes. However, we
believe that, in many situations, agents can benefit from taking a bottom-up
approach: calculating Pareto optimal outcomes in subgroups. In other words,
we pursue the question of whether or not it is possible to estimate some Pareto
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optimal outcomes without knowing or predicting the preferences of all agents. In
essence, solving the Pareto optimal set problem in a smaller group may be less
complicated than in larger groups (e.g., less privacy concerns, less interactions
needed, more willingness to cooperate, etc.) and it may provide a relatively
important ratio of the final Pareto Optimal outcomes. Such kind of property
can be used in some complex group decision making scenarios. Imagine that a
group of agents is negotiating in unison with an unknown opponent [22,27,25]. If
the agents can find the Pareto optimal outcomes within the team, they may use
these outcomes in their bidding strategy to reach a Pareto optimal agreement
with their opponent.
In this paper we explore bottom-up strategies. For that, first we prove that
any Pareto optimal outcome in a subgroup is also Pareto optimal in a larger
group that contains the subgroup, as long as agents’ preferences are strict linear
order. Second, we empirically simulate how bottom-up approaches may perform
in realistic scenarios. More specifically, we show that we can obtain a reasonable
ratio of the Pareto optimal outcomes within a group of agents by only finding
the Pareto optimal outcomes within the subgroup of these agents.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: first we present a proof
of how Pareto optimal solutions in subgroups are also Pareto optimal in larger
groups when agents have strict, transitive, and complete preferences. Section 3
discusses some of the implications of the proof, and how it can be applied to
solve a wide variety of problems in multi-agent systems. In Section 4, we empir-
ically validate the theory in practice and analyze empirically compare the ratio
of Pareto optimal outcomes within subgroups to the Pareto optimal outcomes
within the entire group in a wide variety of real domains. After discussing the
related work, we finally conclude the paper with future lines of work.
2 Pareto optimality in subgroups
In this section we prove that any Pareto optimal outcome in a subgroup of agents
is also Pareto optimal in any group of agents containing the subgroup. First, we
provide some of the necessary definitions and introduce some notation.
Let A = {a1, ..., an} be a set of agents where k is the index of agent ak and
A′ = {a1, ..., am} be a superset of A, A ⊂ A′ where m > n. O is the set of all
possible solutions in a given domain, and o ∈ O represents a possible solution
in the domain. We assume that i represents agent’s ai preference relation over
outcomes in O. If o i o′ then agent ai likes o at least as well as o′, we write
o i o′ to denote a strict preference for o and o = o′ to denote indifference. We
assume that the agents’ preference relations are strict, transitive and complete.
An outcome o∗ is Pareto optimal with respect to A and O, denoted by
po(o∗,A,O) iff
@o ∈ O ∃j ≤ n
n∧
i=1
o i o∗ ∧ o j o∗.
We denote the set of all Pareto optimal outcomes overA byO∗A = {o∗ ∈ O | po(o∗,A,O)} .
Theorem 1. Given a set of outcomes O. For all two sets of agents A and A′,
if A ⊂ A′, then O∗A ⊂ O∗A′ .
Proof. Let us assume by reductio ad absurdum that A ⊂ A′, but O∗A 6⊂ O∗A′ .
This means there exists an o∗ ∈ O∗A such that o∗ /∈ O∗A′ . Expanding the definition
of Pareto optimal outcomes, we have
o∗ /∈ {o ∈ O | @o′ ∈ O ∃k ≤ m,
m∧
i=1
o′ i o ∧ o′ k o}.
This means there must exist an o ∈ O and a k ≤ m such that
m∧
i=1
o i o∗∧o k o∗.
We consider two scenarios: either ak ∈ A or ak /∈ A.
– If ak ∈ A then o is an outcome that dominates o∗ over A, which is not
possible as o∗ is Pareto optimal over A.
– Otherwise, k > n, so we have
n∧
i=1
o i o∗. In that case, as o∗ is Pareto optimal
over A, the condition is only true if all of the agents in A are indifferent
between o and o∗. As preferences are strict, that cannot be true either.
Since both sides lead to a contradiction, we have proven the theorem.
At this point the reader may be wondering how the theorem above behaves
in a scenario where agents’ preferences are not strict. As we will discuss later,
the likeliness of such as scenario is small, but the conclusion of the theorem
above may in fact not hold in that case. Basically, an outcome that is Pareto
optimal in a subgroup A may not be Pareto optimal in the group A′ when all
of the agents in A are indifferent between such outcome and another Pareto
optimal outcome. Then, one of the two outcomes may not be Pareto optimal
with A′ when one of the agents in the group is not indifferent between those
outcomes. Nevertheless, as we shall outline in Section 4.2, such situations are
rare in practice, as all of the agents need to be indifferent between outcomes.
This becomes increasingly unlikely as the group size grows and thus, for large
enough groups, we can consider that the theorem is true for practically any
scenario.
3 Prospective applications
In Section 2 we have demonstrated that an outcome that is Pareto optimal in a
subgroup of agents will also remain Pareto optimal in a larger group5. It should
be highlighted that we are not depicting achieving Pareto optimality as a simple
task. However, there is value in computing Pareto optimality in smaller groups
as long as we are able to use those solutions in more challenging scenarios:
5 For strict, transitive, and complete preferences
– Negotiation teams: In this scenario, a group of individuals negotiate as
a party with opponent(s) to achieve a deal [22,27,26,25,23]. In that case,
finding the outcomes that are Pareto optimal within the team may play in
favor of the team as (i) if the team sticks to these outcomes while negotiating
with opponents, it can ensure efficiency in the final outcome, (ii) the set
of calculated deals may be reused in multiple negotiations with different
opponents as they remain Pareto optimal, and (iii) finding Pareto optimal
outcomes once may reduce the time spent in negotiation threads as the team
exactly knows which outcomes are more beneficial for team members. On top
of that, one can also assume that team members may be more willing to share
information with teammates, which may make easier the search for Pareto
optimal outcomes inside the team.
– Multi-party negotiations: Some participants in a multi-party negotia-
tion [29,6,3,8,10,11] may decide to collude and bias the agreement with their
preferences. For that, the subgroup of agents may calculate Pareto optimal
outcomes within the subgroup, and decide on the Pareto optimal outcomes
that they plan to use in the upcoming multi-party negotiation. This way,
there may be higher probabilities for the negotiation to finish with an out-
come that satisfies the subgroups’ interests and that is efficient. Another
possible application for this proof in multi-party settings is precisely the
idea of looking for Pareto optimal agreements within subgroups of agents.
For instance, agents with high degrees of trust may decide to share some
information that facilitates the search of Pareto optimal outcomes within
the subgroup. Then, once outcomes are found in subgroups, these may be
shared among all of the agents, and the whole group may need to decide on
the most appropriate Pareto optimal outcome.
– Decision making in open environments: Open multi-agent systems
[2,24,12] have the particularity of being systems where agents enter and leave
the system dynamically. In such environments, decision making tasks may
suffer from the same characteristic and agents may enter and leave decision
making tasks as needed, resulting in a real time problem. For those situa-
tions, agents in a decision making task may benefit from a continuous search
for Pareto optimal outcomes. As new agents join the task, those Pareto opti-
mal outcomes calculated should be kept as they will remain Pareto optimal
in the new group. When agents leave, remaining group members can get rid
of some outcomes that have become dominated in the new setting.
As the reader may have noticed, the range of applications where this ap-
proach could be applied is varied. We are not claiming that those are the sole
applications for this approach, and there may be others in domains like social
choice, group recommendations, and so forth.
4 Experimental study
Section 2 shows theoretically that Pareto optimal outcomes within a group of
agents having complete, transitive and strict preferences are still Pareto optimal
when the group size increases with incoming agents. Even when preferences are
non strict, we expect for the theorem to hold in most of the cases. In this section,
we empirically analyze the prospective performance and applicability of bottom-
up approaches. For that purpose, we selected a variety of domains:
– Sushi domain: 5000 preference profiles over 10 types of sushi [15].
– AGH course selection: 153 students’ preferences over 6 courses offered by
AGU University of Science and Technology in 2004 [28].
– Book crossing domain: The original dataset contains preferences of 278,858
users that produced 1,149,780 ratings over 271,379 books [30]. In order to
calculate Pareto optimality, we require preferences to be complete on at least
a subset of items. We kept 7 users that had rated 23 books in common.
– Movielens domain: The original dataset contains 138,000 users that pro-
vided ratings over 27,000 movies [19]. As we require complete preferences, we
picked 10 preference profiles that had rated a total of 298 movies in common.
– Holiday domain: A multi-party negotiation domain available in Genius
[18]. In this scenario, participants need to decide on the details of a holiday
trip. In total, 9 preference profiles over 1024 possible outcomes are avail-
able. These preferences have been elicited from TU Delft computer science
students, but not with serious plans for a joint holiday in mind.
– Symposium domain:Another multi-party negotiation domain that is avail-
able in Genius [18] concerning the organization of a conference. There are 9
preference profiles over 2305 possible outcomes. These preferences have been
elicited from faculty members in computer science of TU Delft experienced
in organizing conferences, but not having a specific conference in mind.
– Party domain: Another multi-party negotiation domain, where agents de-
cide on the details of a party [18]. We elicited preferences from students in a
Master level AI course. Students were asked to input their real preferences
via Genius based on their tastes for hosting parties. In total, we elicited 24
real preference profiles over 3072 outcomes.
From a global perspective, the sushi, agh, and book domain are small attend-
ing to the number of outcomes. These domains correspond to decision making
domains where outcomes are non customizable objects (e.g., a movie, a book,
a course, etc.). The data in the Movielens domain is less sparse and we were
able to find 10 users that had rated 298 outcomes in common. This is again a
domain where outcomes are non customizable, but the size of the domain is one
order of magnitude larger than that of the small domains. The three remaining
multi-party negotiation domains (i.e., holiday, symposium, and party domain)
represent scenarios where the final outcome can be customized via the negotiable
issues. As a result, the number of possible outcomes is larger. We consider these
domains and the Movielens domain as the large domains in our study.
4.1 Validation and Performance Analysis
Our performance metric is the ratio of the Pareto optimal outcomes within a
subgroup with a size of {2, ..., n-1} to the Pareto optimal outcomes within the
n-sized group. If the ratio remains low even for large subgroups, then this means
that the performance of our theoretical finding may be of little value in practice,
as only a small ratio of the final Pareto outcomes may be achievable. However,
if the ratio is large, then it may indicate that bottom-up approaches may be
valuable. Additionally, common sense indicates that, the larger the subgroup,
the higher the ratio of final Pareto optimal outcomes that may be obtained in
the subgroup. However, one question that arises is the actual speed by which
the ratio of final Pareto outcomes increases, and whether or not subgroups may
be able to calculate a respectable ratio of the final Pareto optimal outcomes.
For testing the practical performance of our bottom-up approaches, we ran-
domly generated groups of size n based on the preference profiles available for
each domain. For each randomly generated group, we built all possible sub-
groups with varying sizes {2, .., n − 1} and estimated the Pareto optimal set in
each (sub)group. More specifically, for each domain we tested a maximum of
1000 groups6 of size n = {5, 7, 9}.
Fig. 1. Average ratio of the final Pareto optimal obtained in subgroups of different size
6 The total number is min(1000,
(
m
n
)
), where m is the total number of available pref-
erence profiles and n is the size of the group
The results of this experiment can be observed in Figure 1. As expected, the
results show that the larger the subgroup is, the larger the average ratio of the
final Pareto Optimal set that we get. The increase is clearly continuous for all
of the domains and group sizes. When we look at the results for groups of 7 and
9 members we observe a non-linear increase with the size of the subgroup. This
non-linear increase is not as evident in the case of 5 members’ groups, as in that
case we only have 3 data points7.
One should highlight that for n − 1 agents in the subgroup, n being the
total number of agents in the group, the average ratio of the Pareto optimal set
obtained in the subgroup is always over 50% of the final set, being close to 80% in
some cases (e.g, smaller domains, larger groups). This is a good result, especially
for negotiation team scenarios [22,27,25], where the team could calculate the
Pareto set inside the team and use those outcomes in the negotiation with an
opponent. This is a clear case where a subgroup of size n−1 can be formed (i.e.,
all of the team members) and, according to the experimental results, obtain
a notably high ratio of final Pareto optimal outcomes. Consequently, they can
propose Pareto optimal bids without knowing their opponent’s preferences.
The result is also notable for smaller subgroups. For instance, in groups of
size 5, we are able to obtain between an average of 68% of the final Pareto set
for small domains and 32% for the larger domains with just about half of the
group members (i.e., 3). In the case of groups of size 7, we get 68% of the final
Pareto set for small domains and 28% for larger domains with just about half of
the group members (i.e., 4). Similarly, for groups of size 9 we are able to obtain
an average of 76% of the final Pareto set in small domains, and 30% in large
domains with just about half of group members (i.e., 5).
The trends in the graphics and the results mentioned above may also suggest
that larger domains may result in lower ratios of the final Pareto optimal set
achievable by subgroups. Nevertheless, as we have been able to observe above,
the results can still be considered as positive. Although the current results are
promising, we would like to test a wider range of domains and domain sizes to
strengthen the results of this study.
4.2 Applicability Analysis
There are still other aspects that we need to analyze to determine the applicabil-
ity of bottom-up approaches in real situations. Even though considerable ratios
of the final Pareto optimal set are obtainable within subgroups, this may be
useless in practice if the total number of Pareto optimal outcomes is very close
to all possible outcomes. In those cases, there would be no point in calculating
Pareto optimal outcomes in subgroups, as almost any outcome would be Pareto
optimal. Therefore, we are interested in checking that the set of final Pareto op-
timal outcomes does not dramatically approach the total number of outcomes.
In [20], O’Neill studied how Pareto optimality was affected by the number of
agents participating in a decision making process. To put it simply, the author
7 Even non-linear functions may look like linear when the number of points is reduced
proved that the number of Pareto optimal outcomes grows exponentially with
the number of agents, with the assumption that all preference profiles are equally
probable. Additionally, he proposed a formula to estimate the number of out-
comes that are expected to be Pareto optimal based on the size of the domain
m, and the number of agents in the group n: E(Km,n) = −
m∑
i=1
(−1)i(mi ) 1in−1 .
He also stated that the size of the domain had an effect on the number of
outcomes that were Pareto optimal: larger outcome spaces tend to slow down
the exponential growth of the Pareto optimal set, although the growth is still
exponential. Of course, for drawing such a conclusion, the author had to assume
that all preference profiles were equally probable. We argue that, in practice, all
preference profiles are not equally probable as in some domains not all of the
outcomes may be equally feasible (e.g., high prices in a team of buyers, popular
choices in movies, popular choices in travel destinations, etc.). Hence, we argue
that the exponential growth may not be as fast as in the theoretical case, and
bottom-up approaches may be applicable to more scenarios.
In order to examine this theoretical finding in practice, we calculated the
ratio of the Pareto optimal outcomes to the total number of outcomes for each
domain and group size. Figure 2 shows the average ratio of outcomes that are
Pareto optimal for different groups sizes and domains. In these graphs, blue
dots represent the average ratios calculated in real scenarios while green dots
denote the theoretical estimation provided by [20] for domains of the same size.
In addition to this, for each data point we provide the total number of cases8
that were considered for calculating the average. Numbers in red represent less
than 30 samples and such averages should be ignored.
As it can be observed in Figure 2, the growth in the number of outcomes that
are Pareto optimal is usually slower in real domains than in the theoretical esti-
mation. Being more specific, we observe that only the symposium domain shows
a similar behavior to that of the theoretical case. The rest of the domains deviate
from the theoretical behavior sooner or later, showing a slower saturation. We
can observe that this difference is specially acute in the Movielens, Book, Sushi,
and Agh domain, which are the ones whose preferences have been rigorously
elicited from real users (except for the party domain). This may reinforce our
initial intuition, that, in real domains, the exponential growth on the number
of Pareto optimal outcomes may not be as drastic as in the theoretical case. In
other domains like the party and the holiday domain, the difference is less acute
but still existent.
In fact, if one analyzes the proposed domains one by one, it is possible to
realize that there are general preferential trends. This is clear in domains like
Movielens or the Book domain, where we know that some movies and some books
tend to be more popular than others. For instance, The Shawshank Redemption
is one of the most popular movies of all times, and it has been able to obtain
average ratings of 9.3 over 10 stars in sites like IMDB.9, where it has been voted
8 Again, the total number is min(1000,
(
m
n
)
)
9 http://www.imdb.com. Visited on 16th November 2015
Fig. 2. Average ratio of the final Pareto optimal set obtained with subgroups of differ-
ent size
by more than 1 million users. Similarly, we can find books like Harry Potter and
the Deathly Hallows that have received an average rating of 4.59 over 5 stars
with more than 1 million ratings on sites like GoodReads10. Finding users that
did not like these items has low odds, and as a consequence we can state that
not all preference profiles are equally probable. Not only there are general trends
in users preferences, but many times we find that there are clusters of users with
similar preferences. For instance, in the book domain, we can expect that users
that have liked The Lord of the Rings will also like other fantasy themed books
like Song of Ice and Fire. This is the type of patterns exploited by recommender
systems, and suggests that the number of likely preference profiles is even smaller.
With respect to the other small domains (e.g., AGH, Sushi), we analyzed the
preferences of users. In fact, for analyzing the preferences of users on items we
performed a Borda count with all of the preference profiles. We could observe
that, in the Sushi domain, there are also some popular choices the toro (a total
score of 39445) and some choices that are usually the least liked by users like the
kappa-maki (a total score of 14928). In the case of the AGH domain, we could
also observe that one of the courses (e.g., course 3) was the most preferred one
with a score of 731, whereas the least preferred score had almost half the score.
10 http://www.goodreads.com/. Visited on 16th November 2015
This means that in these domains, preferences are not equally distributed and
one should not expect such an exponential growth as in the theoretical case.
With respect to negotiation domains, we elicited real preferences from the
Party domain, whereas we used the preference profiles provided by Genius in the
Holiday and Symposium domain. Interestingly, we could observe that real users
in the Party domain tend to consider the type of food, the type of drinks, and
the music as the most important attributes. Even in some specific attributes, we
could find that there were popular choices like for instance Beer only for drinks,
and Finger-food and Chips and Nuts for food choices. With respect to the rest of
negotiation domains, it has to be considered that they were not strictly and rigor-
ously elicited like in the case of the party domain. Users were not contextualized
in a specific scenario and their preferences were just elicited from their previous
experiences in similar scenarios. In the case of the Holiday domain, we were able
to observe some patterns like users considering the duration and the activities
as the most important attributes. The users usually preferred longer durations
to shorter durations, and we observed a slight positive inclination towards His-
torical Places and Restaurants. Even in the rest of less important attributes
we were able to find some patterns like the fact that most users preferred Mi-
ami and Amsterdam as destinations. These patterns again show that not all
preference profiles are equally likely, and that is reflected in the fact that the
experimental growth depicted for Figure 2 is slower than the theoretical growth.
On the other hand, the Symposium domain is closer to the theoretical expec-
tation. This may be explainable due to the fact that the Symposium domain
preferences were not elicited thinking on an specific symposium. In contrast to
the Holiday domain, which did not follow a rigorous preference elicitation pro-
cess either, in the Symposium domain it is harder to relate to the scenario, as
it includes totally fictional speakers (e.g. Mr. Talkolot), whereas in the holiday
domain one always can think about his/her own preferences on a trip. This may
explain why the increase in the ratio of Pareto optimal outcomes is similar to
the theoretical case where preference profiles are equally probable. It should be
highlighted that in many negotiation domains, preferences are made different to
test the performance of negotiation algorithms in conflicting scenarios.
The fact that, as we have shown, not all preference profiles are equally likely
makes bottom-up approaches more applicable to real life scenarios than the
results depicted in theory[20]. However, it should be noted that, even though
the growth is slower, the graphics still suggest an increase with the size of the
group and eventually the proof may not be applicable for domains involving a
large number of agents. These results raise an interesting trade-off that should
be analyzed in the future: the relation between the performance of bottom-up
approaches, which increases with the subgroup size, and its applicability, which
decreases with the group size, as nearly all outcomes may be Pareto optimal.
There is another additional issue to be studied concerning the applicability
of bottom-up approaches. As the reader may have guessed, the aforementioned
domains do not guarantee strict preferences. Therefore, some Pareto optimal
outcomes calculated in subgroups may not be Pareto optimal in the whole group
Group size Subgroup size
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5 7% 4% 1% - - - -
7 5% 2% 1% 0.7% 0.3% - -
9 4% 2% 1% 0.7% 0.4% 0.2% 0.07%
Table 1. Average % of false positives calculated in a subgroup
(we call these false positives). In order to study this, we measured the ratio of
false positives in the previous experimental setting. The results are summarized
in Table 1. As it can be observed, the percentage of false positives remains
low for every possible scenario, and it tends to decrease with the size of the
subgroup. This matches our initial intuition, and shows that the proof presented
in this paper practically holds in every situation. Hence, this result supports the
applicability of bottom-up approaches in practice.
5 Related work
As far as these authors are concerned, most of the studies have dedicated their
efforts on reaching Pareto optimal solutions using a horizontal approach that
involves interactions with all group members. In [16], the authors propose a gen-
eral framework for bilateral negotiations where agents are able to reach near
Pareto optimal outcomes by decomposing the negotiation process into iso-utility
curves, from where outcomes are proposed based on the similarity to the last
offer proposed by the opponent. Later, the authors extend their findings to a
multilateral and multi-issue environment where convergence is guaranteed [29].
Ehtamo et al. [11] propose a centralized mechanism for achieving Pareto optimal
outcomes based on real valued linear additive utility functions and information
sharing. Amador et al. [1] propose a task allocation method for agents with
temporal constraints that is capable of providing envy free and Pareto opti-
mal solutions under specific conditions. Other works like [21] have extended the
concept of Pareto optimality to argumentation frameworks. The authors study
different agent attitudes, how they relate to the problem of efficiency in abstract
argumentation dialogues, and define several situations and scenarios that lead
to Pareto optimal arguments. Recently, Hara et al. [10] proposed a mediated
mechanism based on genetic algorithms that is capable of achieving near Pareto
optimal outcomes for multi-party negotiations where agents preferences present
non-linear relationships and change over time. However, none of these works
employ bottom-up approaches, which may prove more useful in some scenarios.
Another field related to our study is that of multi-objective optimization.
Pareto optimality is a well-known efficiency measure in multi-objective opti-
mization [13,17,14]. Similarly to our multiagent decision setting, researchers in
centralized multi-objective optimization have noticed the exponential increase on
the number of Pareto optimal outcomes with the number of objective functions
[7,5]. Due to this unfortunate property of Pareto optimality, some researchers
have offered practical alternatives to the selection of Pareto optimal outcomes.
Di Pierro et al. define the concept of k optimality for deciding over Pareto opti-
mal outcomes. Basically, a non-dominated outcome is defined as k-optimal when
that outcome is non-dominated over every possible combination of k objectives.
Thus, it results in a stronger concept of optimality that may help to choose a so-
lution over a set of Pareto optimal outcomes. We want to highlight the practical
usability of k-optimality on future decision making mechanisms for agents and
how it complements our current findings. First, based on our proof, a subgroups
of agents may calculate Pareto optimal outcomes on subgroups and communi-
cate them to the rest of subgroups. Then, a mechanism may be devised to allow
agents to select a k-optimal outcome over calculated Pareto optimal outcomes.
Finally, economic and theoretical studies are also a source of related work.
As introduced in the text, [20] analyzed how the number of Pareto optimal
outcomes exponentially increases with the number of agents by assuming that
all preference profiles are equally probable. In our present study, we have, among
other contributions, shown how real domains in practice behave with regards to
Pareto optimality. More specifically, we have shown that, despite the increase in
the number of Pareto optimal outcomes with the number of agents, the growth
speed is not as quick as portrayed by [20]. This is, as far as we know, our closest
work in the study of the underlying properties of Pareto optimality. Of course,
there have been other successful studies on Pareto optimality for specific domains
and problems like characterizing fairness, or studying the relationship between
monotonic solutions and Pareto optimality [4,9], but their focus of study has not
been on the exploration of bottom-up approaches for reaching Pareto optimality.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the applicability and performance of bottom-up
approaches for reaching Pareto optimal outcomes in groups. Our analysis shows
that Pareto optimal outcomes in a group remain optimal when increasing the
number of agents in the group in many practical scenarios. This has implications
for bottom-up approaches, as Pareto optimal outcomes may be calculated in
subgroups first, and then be used in scenarios involving the whole group.
We performed experimental analysis on preferences elicited from users in
real-life scenarios and validated that this principle can be applied to a wide
range of domains. Our results on performance and applicability indicate that
we are able to calculate a significant ratio of the final Pareto optimal frontier
within subgroups. Conversely, we analyzed the applicability of our approach
by considering how the ratio of Pareto outcomes increases with the size of the
group. Our findings highlight that this increase is not as abrupt as expected
in theoretical studies, as not all preference profiles are equally likely in many
real-life domains. Still, the increase of the ratio of final Pareto optimal outcomes
points to a necessary trade off in practice, which we plan to analyze in the future.
Additionally, as a future work, we plan to design novel negotiation approaches
for intra-team negotiations that benefit from our findings. In particular, we plan
to design a negotiation strategy for negotiation teams, which first calculate the
Pareto optimal solutions within the team using our approach, and then target
that set of Pareto optimal proposals when negotiating with the opponent.
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